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1. INTRODUCTION; ASTEROID MINING AND THE LAW
Asteroid mining is one of the hot topics today not only within the 
space arena at large, but also in the more specific domain of space law, 
comprising “every legal or regulatory regime having a significant impact, 
even if implicitly or indirectly, on at least one type of space activity or 
major space application.”2 The main reason for this lies in the well-
developed plans of U.S. companies Planetary Resources3 and Deep 
Space Industries4 to launch missions within the next few years to first 
reconnoiter asteroids of potential interest from a commercial perspective 
1. Harvey & Susan Perlman Alumni/Othmer Professor of Space Law,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln & Director, Black Holes Space Law and Policy 
Consultancy. 
2. Frans von der Dunk, Preface to HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, xxiv, xxvi (Frans
von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015). 
3. Amir Efrati, Start-Up Outlines Asteroid-Mining Strategy, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
24, (2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303459004577364110378178038; 
Asteroids Will Unlock the Solar System’s Economy, PLANETARY RESOURCES,
http://www.planetaryresources.com/asteroids/#asteroids-market-opportunity (last visited 
Sep. 20, 2017). 
4. Mike Wall, Asteroid-Mining Project Aims for Deep-Space Colonies,
SPACE.COM (Jan. 22, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://www.space.com/19368-asteroid-mining-
deep-space-industries.html; Asteroid Mining, DEEP SPACE INDUSTRIES,
https://deepspaceindustries.com/mining/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017).  
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and then start harvesting valuable resources, ranging from water to such 
minerals as iron, nickel, and platinum, and selling them.5
From a legal perspective, these plans essentially raise questions of 
their compatibility with international space law, “a branch of general 
(public) international law, a subset of rules, rights[,] and obligations of 
states within the latter specifically related to outer space and activities in 
or with respect to that realm,”6 and in particular with respect to the 2015 
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act,7 Title IV of which 
addresses asteroid mining in a domestic United States context.8 This 
paper purports to provide an overview of exactly those questions, 
analyzing and evaluating the two main strands of interpretation currently 
visible in this respect, while also addressing the international 
ramifications of asteroid mining and their consequences in the legal 
context. 
Following the launch of Sputnik I in 1957, the first discussions in the 
context of the United Nations, more specifically in the Legal Sub-
Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(UNCOPUOS), on space law arose and within some two decades gave 
rise to an embryonic yet almost all-encompassing legal regime for space 
activities.9 Even though the treaties drafted in that timeframe largely 
focused on the peaceful and safe use of outer space as well as scientific 
exploration,10 they still provide the legal framework within which such 
asteroid exploitation now should take place. Two treaties stand out from 
5. See supra text accompanying notes 2–3.
6. Frans von der Dunk, International Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW,
supra note 1, at 29, 29. 
7. See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. 114–90,
129 Stat. 704 (2015). 
8. Title IV is entitled “Space Resource Exploration and Utilization.” Id. §§ 401–
02 (codified at 51 U.S.C §§ 51301–03). 
9. See, e.g., MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 27–39 (2010);
FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 1–22 (2016); Stephan Hobe, 
Historical Background, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 1, 2–12 (Stephan 
Hobe et al. eds., 2009). 
10. See, e.g., Kai-Uwe Schrogl & Julia Neumann, Article IV, in 1 COLOGNE
COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, supra note 8, at 70, 70–85; C.Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 20–37 (1984); Stephan Hobe, Article I, in 1
COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 25, supra note 8, at 25, 34–6.
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this perspective: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,11 ratified by over 100 
states including all major spacefaring nations,12 and the 1979 Moon 
Agreement,13 in spite of only counting 16 ratifications as of yet,14 none of 
which are major spacefaring nations. 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT FOR ASTEROID MINING – THE
OUTER SPACE TREATY
As for the Outer Space Treaty, the states involved in its genesis in the 
late sixties did not seriously consider the possibilities for commercial 
exploitation of celestial bodies’ resources, so that concept is essentially 
missing.15 Not even the term commercial exploitation can be found in the 
treaty, although most experts would agree that the reference to the 
freedom of use in Article I would include commercial exploitation.16
Beyond this very general clause, there are five clauses that have a 
bearing on the mining issue, even if not mentioning it explicitly. 
11. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer 
Space Treaty]; See, e.g., Bin Cheng, The 1967 Space Treaty, 95 J. DU DROIT INT’L 532 
(1968), reprinted in BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 215, 215–64
(1997); P.G. Dembling, Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in 1 MANUAL 
ON SPACE LAW 1, 1–51 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana & Roy S.K. Lee eds., 1979). 
12. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal
Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2016/CRP.3, at 10 (Apr. 
4, 2016). 
13. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 11, 1984) 
[hereafter Moon Agreement]. See, e.g., Stephan Hobe et al., The 1979 Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in 2 COLOGNE
COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 325, 325–426 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2013); Bin Cheng, 
The Moon Treaty, 33 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 213 (1980), reprinted in CHENG, supra 
note 10, at 357, 357–80. 
14. Comm. On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 11, at 10.
15. See, e.g., Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization, in
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 1, at 769, 777. 
16. See Stephan Hobe, Adequacy of the Current legal and Regulatory Framework
Relating to the Extraction and Appropriation of Natural Resources, 32 ANNALS OF AIR
AND SPACE L. 115, 116–20 (2007). 
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Most importantly, Article II provides that national appropriation of 
celestial bodies, whether by sovereignty or by other means, is 
prohibited.17 This clause has generally been perceived to establish outer 
space as a “global commons,” an area not subject to any individual 
state’s legal authority and jurisdiction yet free for all states to access, as 
long as they are in compliance with any other applicable rules of 
international law.18 In other words, it refers to the prohibition of any 
colonization in the legal sense of the word—that is, exercising territorial 
sovereignty over a piece of land as if it were an outlying part of the 
motherland and exercising complete and exclusive jurisdiction over it.19
The main question here is what that means for the granting of mining 
rights: who is entitled to do so, and under what conditions? 
Second, Article I requires exploration and use to be for the benefit of 
mankind.20 Here, the question would be how the benefit of mankind 
would have to be interpreted in the context of possible mining 
17. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. II (“Outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of 
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”).
18. See, e.g., von der Dunk, supra note 5, at 55–60; Bin Cheng, The Legal
Regime of Airspace and Outer Space, 5 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE L. 323 (1980), 
reprinted in CHENG supra note 10, at 425, 434–44; Steven Freeland & Ram Jakhu, 
Article II, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, supra note 8, at 44, 48–55.
19. Cf., e.g., Randall Lasaffer, The Classic Law of Nations (1500–1800), in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 408, 439–
40 (Alexander Orakhelashvili ed., 2011). 
20. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I.
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of
economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of
all mankind.
Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall
be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law, and there shall be free access
to all areas of celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall
facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such
investigation.
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operations. Should everyone share in the proceeds? Should the mined 
resources be made available on the world market? Or does it merely 
mean that no other state should suffer harm from whatever mining 
activities would take place? 
Third, Article VI provides for direct and full state responsibility with 
regard to private space activities, including asteroid mining, and requires 
them to be subject to “authorization and continuing supervision.”21
Usually, this clause is interpreted as requiring a national scheme for 
licensing private space operators and subjecting them to relevant 
obligations and procedures.22 A major issue is, however, what exactly 
constitutes the “national activities in outer space,” which Article VI 
makes reference to.23 Fourth, concurrently with Article VI, Article VII of 
the Outer Space Treaty (as further elaborated by the 1972 Liability 
Convention)24 provides that states are also liable for damage caused by 
space objects—including those used for space mining operations 
operated by private operators under their aegis.25
21. Id. art. VI.
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility
for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with
the pro- visions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of
non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.
See also, e.g., Michael Gerhard, Article VI, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW,
supra note 8, at 103, 111–22; FRANS G. VON DER DUNK, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC
INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN ‘SPACESCAPE’ 17–22 (1998). 
22. Cf. Irmgard Marboe, National Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW,
supra note 1, at 127, 131–35.
23. See, e.g., von der Dunk, supra note 5, 53–54.
24. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1972) 
[hereafter Liability Convention].
25. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, Art.VII.
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory
or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or
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Finally, Article IX obliges states to ensure that space activities 
undertaken by them or their nationals shall not cause harmful 
interference with other legitimate space activities unless prior 
consultation with possibly affected states has taken place.26 This clause 
has gradually come to be interpreted as disallowing the causation of 
serious harmful interference unless overriding reasons would require that 
activity to go ahead anyway.27 This clause is about the most substantive 
requirement resting upon mining operations as far as the Outer Space 
Treaty itself is concerned. 
3. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT FOR ASTEROID MINING—THE
MOON AGREEMENT
As for the Moon Agreement, it was drafted with the intention partially 
to also address possible commercial exploitation, as this seemed to lie 
around the corner.28 Noting that it was never ratified by the major 
juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the 
Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies. 
See also, e.g., Armel Kerrest & Lesley Jane Smith, Article VII, in 1 COLOGNE
COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, supra note 8, at 126, 129–145; VON DER DUNK, supra note 
20, at 22–26.
26. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, Art. IX
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity
or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities of other States
Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake
appropriate international consultations before proceeding with
any such activity or experiment.
See also, e.g., Sergio Marchisio, Article IX, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, 
supra note 8, at 169, 174–81; LOTTA VIIKARI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ELEMENT IN SPACE
LAW 59–62 (2008); Howard A. Baker, Protection of the Outer Space Environment: 
History and Analysis of Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, in 12 ANNALS OF AIR &
SPACE L. 143, 166–67 (1987). 
27. Cf., e.g., VIIKARI, supra note 25, at 59–60; Marchisio, supra note 25, at 176–
77.
28. Moon Agreement, supra note 12, Preamble (“Bearing in mind the benefits
which may be derived from the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon and 
other celestial bodies.”); id. art. 11(5) (“States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake 
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spacefaring nations, it is nevertheless worthwhile to briefly discuss it 
here since the original text was developed in agreement between major 
spacefaring nations, including the United States.29
The Moon Agreement determined that the Moon, other celestial 
bodies, and their natural resources were the “common heritage of 
mankind” and called for an international regime to implement that 
concept in the context of interests in mining operations30— without, 
however, specifying any details.31 When, in the contemporaneous 
discussions on the legal regime for the deep seabed resulting in the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,32 the common heritage of mankind 
concept came to be specifically elaborated as requiring the transfer of 
relevant technology and the ultimate sharing of mining proceeds,33 the 
to establish an international régime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become 
feasible.”) (emphasis added).  
29. Cf. Peter Jankowitsch, The Background and History of Space Law, in
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 1, at 1, 5–6.
30. See Moon Agreement, supra note 12, art. 11(1) (“The moon and its natural
resources are the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the 
provisions of this Agreement and in particular in paragraph 5 of this article.”); Moon 
Agreement, supra note 27, art. 11(5). 
31. Id. art. 11(7).
The main purposes of the international regime to be established
shall include:
(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of
the Moon;
(b) The rational management of those resources;
(c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources;
(d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits
derived from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of
the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries
which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the
exploration of the moon, shall be given special consideration.
See also, e.g., CHRISTOL, supra note 9, at 342–63; FABIO TRONCHETTI, THE EXPLOITATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 41–61 (F.G. von 
der Dunk, ed. 2009). 
32. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 133–91, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
33. See TRONCHETTI, supra note 30, at 45–61; LOTTA VIIKARI, FROM MANGANESE
NODULES TO LUNAR REGOLITH 52–54 (2002). 
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major spacefaring nations—including again the United States—refrained 
from signing and ratifying it.34 The Moon Agreement, in spite of its 
relatively limited formal importance, offers a few interesting aspects for 
consideration with regards to the appropriate international legal approach 
to space mining. 
First, Article 1(1) in principle allows for a special regime in deviation 
from the Moon Agreement, including for instance its application of the 
common heritage of mankind concept, to be developed.35 If it would be 
considered helpful and feasible to develop an international regime 
specifically addressing the mining of asteroids, in a manner more 
conducive to stimulating private entrepreneurship than the original 
implementation of the common heritage of mankind concept in the 
context of the Law of the Sea, then this clause allows that, even as far as 
both the staunch adherents to that concept or parties to the Moon 
Agreement would be concerned. 
Second, it is interesting to note that the Moon Agreement itself 
already excludes from its scope “extraterrestrial materials which reach 
the surface of the earth by natural means.”36 While resources extracted by 
mining companies obviously do not reach the surface of the Earth by 
natural means, the distinction already made here between celestial bodies 
and extraterrestrial materials is noteworthy. The asteroids targeted by the 
space mining companies would likely be magnitudes smaller in size than 
the celestial bodies usually addressed under that heading, such as the 
Moon and planets. Landing on a celestial body would constitute a rather 
different mission than landing on an asteroid, which may come much 
closer to capturing extraterrestrial materials. The distinction made in the 
Moon Agreement may provide further justification for the argument that 
the prohibition to “appropriate” celestial bodies pursuant to Article II of 
the Outer Space Treaty does not extend to extraterrestrial materials, the 
34. See VIIKARI, supra note 32, at 68–72.
35. Moon Agreement, supra note 12, art. 1(1) (“The provisions of this
Agreement relating to the moon shall also apply to other celestial bodies within the solar 
system, other than the earth, except in so far as specific legal norms enter into force with 
respect to any of these celestial bodies.”).  
36. Id. art 1(3). See, e.g., LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 8, at 175–77; Nicolas M.
Matte, Legal Principles Relating to the Moon, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note 
10, at 253, 258.
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latter also referring to something magnitudes smaller than the classic 
celestial bodies.37
Third, the common heritage of mankind principle may suggest some 
mandatory sharing of benefits and technology as per the elaboration in 
the context of the Law of the Sea, the Moon Agreement; it certainly does 
not simply provide or confirm this. In building upon the general 
prohibition of national appropriation in the Outer Space Treaty, namely, 
it provides: “Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any 
part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any 
State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, 
national organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural 
person.”38 The addition of “in place” suggests that once extracted, such 
resources could by contrast legitimately become the property of, for 
instance, private operators. 
4. BACK TO THE OUTER SPACE TREATY: INTERPRETING THE NON-
APPROPRIATION PROHIBITION
In sum, the clauses most pertinent to the question of the legal status, 
even legality, of space mining, are certainly those defining the legal 
status of outer space as a global commons, as addressed above pursuant 
to Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty. Without any helpful 
specific reference to space mining, however, that leaves the question 
what that status means, or how it should be interpreted, in that context. 
Basically, there would be two approaches: One is to argue that, since 
outer space belongs to all of mankind, all natural resources available also 
belong to all of mankind. This means that a regime basically of an 
international character should determine who should be allowed access 
to those resources for the purpose of commercial exploitation. 
Additionally, for at least some, this also means that regime should 
principally drive for a form of benefit- and technology-sharing along the 
lines of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, as discussed 
above.39
37. See Outer Space Treaty supra note 16 and accompanying text.
38. Moon Agreement, supra note 12, art. 11(3) (emphasis added). See, e.g.,
Cheng, supra note 12, at 368–69; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 8, at 185. 
39. See discussion supra Section 3.
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As for the latter, it should be noted that the 1994 New York 
Agreement40 de facto amended the 1982 Convention so as to do away 
with the aspects considered most anti-private-enterprise even while 
formally maintaining the qualification of the deep seabed as being part of 
the common heritage of mankind.41 While technically speaking a license 
from an international organization—the “International Seabed Authority”
established by the 1982 Convention42—would still be required, the 
likelihood that it would not be granted in a manner the licensee would 
appreciate is reduced considerably. 
As for the former, nothing is said about the specificity or level of 
detail of what an international regime refers to, in line with the relatively 
open-ended phrasing of Articles 11(5) and (7) of the Moon Agreement. 
Thus, the closest analogy might well be the international regime 
currently regulating up to a certain level the access to satellite orbits, 
orbital slots, and frequencies within the framework of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU).43 While this regime unequivocally 
endorses commercial exploitation of the relevant natural resources of 
outer space (satellite orbits, orbital slots, and radio frequencies), it is 
fundamentally built on the law of nature that two contemporary users of 
the same frequency in the same area will both suffer interference and 
thus would be keen to ensure that access to such frequencies is regulated 
at an international level.44 This has certainly played a major role in 
making states willing to accept the system of coordination of the use of 
orbits, orbital slots, and frequencies developed within the ITU as binding 
40. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1996, 1836 U.N.T.S. 
42 [hereinafter New York Agreement]. 
41. See VIIKARI, supra note 32, 73–78; TRONCHETTI, supra note 30, 116–18.
42. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 31, arts.
156–69. 
43. The current legal foundations of the ITU are comprised by the ITU
Constitution and Convention, as well as the ITU Radio Regulations, the most recent of 
which concerns the 2016 one. Constitution of the International Telecommunication 
Union, Dec. 22, 1992, 1825 U.N.T.S. 330; Convention of the International 
Telecommunication Union, Dec. 22, 1992, 1825 U.N.T.S. 390; Radio Regulations 2016,
ITU, http://www.itu.int/pub/R-REG-RR-2016 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017). 
44. See, e.g., LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 8, at 199–244; Frans von der Dunk,
Legal Aspects of Satellite Communications, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 1, 
at 456, 458–84.
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law.45 It remains to be seen, of course, whether similar parameters apply 
with respect to space mining and whether they would result in a similar 
willingness. 
The other approach would argue that since outer space has been 
qualified as a global commons, all states are ipso facto entitled to use 
resources for their own benefit, which would include unilaterally 
allowing their private operators to exploit them, as long as this is done in 
compliance with applicable international law.46 The analogy closest to 
such an approach would be fishing on the high seas. The high seas are 
considered global commons as much as outer space, meaning that 
appropriation of part of the high seas as exclusively national territory is 
not allowed.47 At the same time, the freedom of fishing, one of the 
fundamental freedoms of the high seas,48 means that in spite of such non-
appropriation of the high seas themselves, the fish caught there would 
legitimately belong to whoever caught it—provided they would comply 
with international law regarding, for instance, overfishing or pollution.49
Consequently, individual states would be entitled to unilaterally license 
fishing companies to fish on the high seas, as long as the companies 
remain within the above legal parameters. 
5. UNILATERAL ACTION: TITLE IV, U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH
COMPETITIVENESS ACT
The proper authoritative interpretation, as between the two general 
approaches outlined above, has not yet been determined. This leaves the 
45. See Francis Lyall, ‘Harmful Interference’ and the ITU, in HARMFUL 
INTERFERENCE IN REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE 19, 20 (Mahulena Hofmann ed., 2015). 
46. Cf., e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 333–51 (8th ed. 2012) (discussing cooperation in the use of national 
resources in various contexts); Jankowitsch, supra note 28, at 12–14. 
47. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 31, art. 89.
48. See id. art. 87(1)(e).
49. See id. art. 87(2); Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88; International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 amended by Protocol of 1978 
Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 
17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61. 
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question of whether an international regime would be a mandatory 
prerequisite before space mining would become legal and before national 
authorities could start licensing relevant companies unilaterally. So far, 
this question is without a definitive and generally acknowledged answer. 
As, however, Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries were 
pushing forward,50 the United States was pressed into taking some action 
in the absence of any definitive and generally acknowledged regime. The 
one serious effort to establish such a regime, the Moon Agreement, had 
essentially fallen short by failing to carry the agreement of the 
spacefaring countries, and nothing of substance had yet taken its place.51
The result of this pressure was, after an initial bill had addressed the 
mining issue only,52 the inclusion of Title IV on Space Resource 
Exploration and Utilization in the 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act.53 It provided a first level of legally-framed support 
and guarantees to the incipient asteroid mining sector by adding Chapter 
513 to Title 51 of the United States Code, consisting of three Sections.54
These additions achieved three results. 
First, it recognizes the property rights of U.S. citizens and companies 
over space resources once extracted on a first come, first served basis for 
disputes playing out within U.S. jurisdiction and in stated compliance 
“with the international obligations of the United States.”55 In other 
words, potential claims—in particular from outside the United States—
that such extracted space resources would constitute the spoils of illegal 
activities or would have to be somehow shared internationally under a 
50. See supra text accompanying notes 2–4.
51. See supra text accompanying note 28.
52. American Space Technology for Exploring Resource Opportunities In Deep
Space Act, H.R.5063, 113th Cong. (2014). 
53. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, ch. 513, § 402, Pub. L.
No. 114–90, 129 Stat. 704, 720–22 (codified at 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303 (2015)).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 51303 now provides:
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an
asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be
entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained,
including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid
resource or space resource obtained in accordance with
applicable law, including the international obligations of the
United States.
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possible interpretation of the common heritage of mankind principle 
would not be recognized by any U.S. court. Second, it calls for future
regulation to authorize and supervise in further detail any operator 
interested in engaging in asteroid mining and thus potentially benefitting 
from the legitimacy of ownership rights, in conformity notably with the 
requirement resting upon the United States under Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty to authorize and continuously supervise such activities.56
Third, it calls upon the U.S. President to promote the interests of U.S. 
industry in the global context.57 Effectively, this means by way of some 
sort of international regime sympathetic to the interests of the United 
States and its companies. The market for space resources would by all 
accounts be global in nature; recognition of legitimate ownership rights 
of companies over celestial resources in the United States would not 
necessarily be accepted in other countries where an interest in such 
56. Id. § 51302(b) now provides:
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section,
the President shall submit to Congress a report on commercial
exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources by
United States citizens that specifies—
(1) the authorities necessary to meet the international obligations
of the United States, including authorization and continuing
supervision by the Federal Government; and (2)
recommendations for the allocation of responsibilities among
Federal agencies for the activities described in paragraph (1).
57. Id. § 51302(a) now provides:
The President, acting through appropriate Federal agencies,
shall—
(1) facilitate commercial exploration for and commercial
recovery of space resources by United States citizens;
(2) discourage government barriers to the development in the
United States of economically viable, safe, and stable industries
for commercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space
resources in manners consistent with the international obligations
of the United States; and
(3) promote the right of United States citizens to engage in
commercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space
resources free from harmful interference, in accordance with the
international obligations of the United States and subject to
authorization and continuing supervision by the Federal
Government.
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resources might otherwise exist. On the other hand, Article I of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade may present an argument that 
if, for instance, platinum mined on a celestial body would be brought 
back to earth pursuant to the U.S. legal regime, other states could not 
contest the legality of its enjoyment of free trade benefits as a “like 
product.”58
The discussion at the international level on this issue has essentially 
just taken off. So far, two countries have clearly shown to be sympathetic 
to the U.S. approach. Luxembourg, a small country, but serving as a 
gateway to the European Union as a whole,59 has already announced the 
establishment of a national law authorizing and supervising space mining 
activities generally along the lines of the U.S. approach.60 The United 
Arab Emirates have equally planned to develop a regulatory regime 
conducive to such activities, provided that those activities are duly 
authorized and supervised.61
58. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I(1), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed 
on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed 
on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, 
and with respect to the method of levying such duties and 
charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in 
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to 
all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any 
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of 
all other contracting parties. 
59. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 28(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 (providing that once a product is 
legitimately brought “in free circulation” in one EU member state, it should be allowed to 
be freely traded across all member states). 
60. See SPACE RESOURCES.LU, http://www.spaceresources.public.lu/en.html (last
visited Feb. 11, 2017); Loi 674 du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des 
ressources de l’espace [Law 674 of July 20, 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space 
Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE LUXEMBOURG [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
JOURNAL OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG], July 28, 2017, 
http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo. 
61. See UAE to Finalise Space Laws Soon, THE NAT’L (Mar. 7, 2016, 4:00
AM), 
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On the other end, at least two countries have so far voiced their 
general opposition to the U.S. legislative initiative in the context of 
UNCOPUOS. First, the Russian representative in the Scientific and 
Legal Sub-Committee (not the Legal Sub-Committee!) has claimed that 
the U.S. legislation:  
x shows disrespect for international law by allowing the U.S. private
sector to appropriate and sell space resources as per Title IV; 
x presents a new interpretation of the concept of non-appropriation of
outer space; 
x shows disregard for the discussions in the context of the Moon
Agreement, which would call for an international regime to regulate 
any exploitation; 
x constitutes an element of the U.S. policy of domination of outer
space; and 
x presents a concept of ‘freedom to use outer space’ which is not law
but merely a theory of experts and specialized fora.62
The problem with the first claim is that essentially, as analyzed above, 
there is no international law of any relevant specificity addressing the 
issues of asteroid mining and ownership rights over extracted resources. 
This includes the concept of non-appropriation, which is clearly 
addressing only celestial bodies as such but is silent on natural resources 
contained in them. Considering that unilateral licensing of exploitation of 
the latter is allowable would constitute a new interpretation only because 
there has, so far, not been any interpretation which has been widely 
accepted as authoritative. From that same vantage point, the 
interpretation that such unilaterally condoned exploitation would not be 
permitted is equally new. 
http://www.thenational.ae/business/aviation/uae-to-finalise-space-laws-soon. 
62. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Reviewing Opportunities for
Achieving the Vienna Consensus on Space Security Encompassing Several Regulatory 
Domains: Working Paper Submitted by the Russian Federation, ¶¶ 5–7, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.1/2016/CRP.15 (Feb. 16, 2016). 
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The claim of showing disregard for the discussions leading to the 
Moon Agreement suggests that, because the United States initially 
agreed to the text thereof, including the phrasing of the common heritage 
of mankind concept, it would be somehow bound to recognize that 
unequivocally. First, this fails to recognize that in international law 
concepts such as signature and ratification have been developed to 
confirm a measure of willingness to be bound by the text63 (as opposed to 
an acceptance of the text before such events), both of which the United 
States choose to abstain from. Second, it fails to recognize that the Soviet 
Union at the time, later Russia, also did not sign or ratify the Moon 
Agreement, so as to clearly express its agreement to it as a legally 
binding document. Legally speaking, this makes it rather difficult for 
Russia to base any claim of non-compliance on the basis thereof against 
the United States. Third, as discussed above, even the Moon Agreement 
itself as per its Article 11(3) accepted that the non-appropriation 
principle would not apply to resources once extracted.64
The reference to U.S. policy on space domination is political and 
rather reminiscent of Cold War rhetoric, as the activities addressed are 
purely commercially oriented and have nothing to do with any specific 
U.S. policy of ensuring that no potential adversary could gain the 
military or strategic upper hand in outer space. Whereas, finally, the 
freedom of use of outer space is not a theoretical hypothesis of some 
academics, but is enshrined in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, as 
briefly addressed before.65
The other country which apparently raised objections to the U.S. 
legislation at an early stage is Brazil, which has claimed: 
x inconsistency between national law allowing economic exploitation
of celestial bodies and the principles of the U.N. space treaties; 
63. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. This treaty is generally considered to reflect customary international law on the law 
of treaties, it provides: “The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed 
by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.” Id. art. 11. 
64. See sources cited supra note 35 and accompanying text.
65. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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x that multilateral interests should take precedence over unilateral
ones; and 
x that domestic legislation is a poor substitute for a multilateral
instrument.66
While the first claim is, again, a matter of interpretation—the relevant 
principles are not specific enough to either validate or deny the claim of 
inconsistency—the two other points are correct. In an area such as the 
global commons of outer space, multilateral interests should prevail, 
which would point toward an international legal instrument as the 
preferred option. Even the United States would not seem to disagree with 
this in principle, as that is precisely why the U.S. President is charged to 
enter into international discussions to make that happen67—of course in 
the hope that such a multilateral approach would be very much along the 
lines of the U.S. one.  
The point is further that, in the absence so far of any more or less 
acceptable and accepted international instrument—the Moon Agreement 
having failed to achieve this purpose, with no serious initiative ever since 
trying to replace it with something more acceptable—the United States 
had to take some action to address the interests of Planetary Resources 
and Deep Space Industries and at the same time to properly comply with 
its international obligations by initiating a process towards authorization 
and continuing supervision in line with Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty.68
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Currently, the international legal uncertainty regarding the proper and 
generally accepted regime applicable to asteroid mining remains 
unresolved. The United States has taken a first, rather embryonic step to 
address the issue by allowing asteroid mining entrepreneurs a first degree 
66. E-mail from Fabio Tronchetti, Assoc. Professor at the Sch. of Law of the
Harbin Inst. of Tech., to Frans von der Dunk, Professor of Law, Neb. Coll. of Law (Mar. 
11, 2016) (on file with author) (discussing statement of the Brazilian representative to the 
Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee).
67. See 51. U.S.C. § 51302(a) (2015).
68. See id. § 51302(b).
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of legal certainty regarding their ownership rights at least under U.S. law, 
while indicating that before any actual mining operation would be 
condoned, a more detailed approach to licensing such activities is to be 
developed. This approach prominently includes compliance with the 
international obligations of the United States, which refers inter alia to 
such key requirements under the Outer Space Treaty as to authorize and 
continuously supervise them in accordance with Article VI, to accept 
state liability for any damage resulting from such activities in line with 
Article VII and the ensuing Liability Convention, and to ensure that 
harmful interference with other legitimate space activities remains at a 
minimum, on the basis of Article IX.69 With a view to the current status 
of international law on the issue, that approach cannot be qualified as 
illegal, although it remains important to monitor whether the licensing 
regime to be ultimately developed in the United States will indeed 
diligently comply with obligations resting upon the United States under 
international law. 
Various scenarios as to how the international situation will develop 
can be discerned. The worst-case scenario is a continuing fragmentation 
of the legal situation with certain countries going in one direction and 
others going in another. This will effectively amount to the continued 
absence of a proper legal regime at the international level, which will 
give rise to international strife and likely be a recipe for commercial 
uncertainty, mala fide entrepreneurs going ahead regardless, or 
politically motivated land-grabs. 
Whilst the, perhaps, optimum scenario of arriving top-down at an 
overarching treaty-like regime is not realistic for the moment, 
considering on the one hand the failure of the Moon Agreement from this 
perspective and on the other hand the general unwillingness to accept 
treaty obligations in the field of space activities, the third scenario might 
be the most likely to arise. This is effectively a bottom-up approach, 
whereby other countries start to more or less follow the U.S. approach, 
enunciate their own national laws on the issue while ensuring compliance 
with the Outer Space Treaty and other relevant elements of international 
space law, and thus gradually coming to a common understanding of 
what should be considered legitimate or legally allowed. 
69. See id. §§ 51302, 51303.
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For such a scenario, there is a very interesting precedent: when U.S. 
President Harry Truman in 1945 declared that the continental shelf 
stretching outwards from the territorial waters of the United States for 
reasons of geology should be considered an extension of the U.S. 
landmass, and at least the economic exploitation thereof hence subject to 
U.S. coastal state jurisdiction, this strictly speaking was against 
customary international law as it stood at the time.70 That law allowed 
coastal states jurisdiction over territorial waters at most a few miles 
offshore; beyond that the freedom of the high seas ruled, allowing every 
state to exploit any natural resources, unless other specific rules of 
international law conditioned or prohibited such exploitation.71 However, 
rather than protesting this unilateral extension of U.S. coastal state 
jurisdiction, most states acknowledged the validity of the geological-
continuation argument, and started to assert similar claims with respect 
to their respective continental shelves.72 Within a little more than a 
decade, the concept of the continental shelf then was transformed into 
treaty law by the enunciation of the 1958 Convention on the Continental 
Shelf.73
Note that while this scenario developed from what could be classified 
as an illegal claim with respect to an existing international rule, the 
assumption is that for the space mining context what is at issue is less 
controversial as merely comprising a particular interpretation of an 
existing but vague international legal principle. This should make it 
feasible to arrive at a widely agreed approach amongst spacefaring 
nations to allow national licensing of mining operations as long as the 
relevant overriding public interests in the safety, security, and general 
international legality of space activities would be guaranteed to be 
protected thereby. 
70. Proclamation No. 2667, 59 Stat. 884 (1945). See also Peter-Tobias Stoll,
Continental Shelf, in 2 MAX PLANK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 720
(2012); Malcolm D. Evans, The Law of the Sea, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 651, 670–71
(4th ed. 2014). 
71. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 45, at 255–57.
72. See Frans G. von der Dunk, Effective Exercise of ‘In-Space Jurisdiction’: The
US Approach and the Problems It Is Facing, 40 J. OF SPACE L. 147, 160 (2015). 
73. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 312.
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